Bioethics, healthcare policy, and related issues.
There’s a provocative post over at the excellent KevinMD Web site:
Overeating is a behavioral problem, not a surgical one
This may seem to be a statement of the obvious, but the solution to a behavioral problem is not surgery. Overeating is not a surgical problem — it is a behavioral one. The problem is not because the stomach is too big and needs to be made smaller. It is a function of how much food is put into the stomach. Surgical “solutions” should be the absolute last resort measure.
The letter – from an Australian physician who touts himself on the Web as a “DIY health” guru – goes on to make a number of good points about bariatric surgery (mostly stomach-banding), couched in terms of clinical efficacy and relative risk: it does not work for everyone; the campaign to expand the qualifying criteria may include patients who have marginal need or expected benefit; there are known side effects and long-term safety is unknown; the promoters are compromised by conflicts of interest. These are all relevant considerations. But the overall tone in the letter, and even more so the comments, is both judgmental and dismissive. (From commenters: “People are obese simply because of their own behavioral inability to control their diet . . . the solution still lies FIRST in the individual admitting his/her 100% responsibility in the problem weight.” “Obesity results solely from laziness and apathy, which consequently are the same traits that are leading to the devolution of our species.”)
The giveaway here is the headline: yes, overeating is of course a “behavioral problem”, not a surgical one, because in this context “behavioral problem” clearly refers to the etiology of a pathological condition (obesity), while “surgical [problem]” clearly refers to the preferred mode of treatment for that condition. The writer conflates the two categories, and then draws an inference from a logical contradiction of his own making: it’s true that the etiology of this condition is not its treatment, but that’s true in every case, so that hardly tells against that treatment considered in and of itself. We can reinterpret the sentence to make sense, but only by making it obviously absurd: either “Overeating is a behavioral treatment, not a surgical treatment” or “Overeating, not surgery, is the cause of obesity”. There is a vacuity of clinical concepts here that suggests something else is at work in the writer’s animosity to certain kinds of treatments.
What the writer is really trying to say is this: “Obesity is caused by behavior, and should not be treated by surgery”. And the logical implication of that statement, and the letter and comments that follow, is this: “Obesity is caused by behavior, and therefore should not be treated by surgery”. The clinical counter-indications for surgery (and medical treatments for obesity – he’s against pills, too) that the writer details do not really seem to be the issue in his mind. Instead, certain treatments are ruled in or out categorically, on the basis of criteria of appropriateness that seem to hinge on his view of what health and medicine are fundamentally about, or how they are fundamentally related. There is a sense that diet is better than medical treatment because it is lower-risk, but also a sense that people who brought their conditions upon themselves behaviorally should be expected to work out their own salvation without clinical intervention. There is a clear implication that the writer would still object to bariatric surgery even if it were safer and more effective, simply because it’s not the kind of treatment he thinks this condition should get, in some essential sense (“obvious[ly] . . . the solution to a behavioral problem is not surgery”). Because the condition is behavioral, the treatment should be behavioral: QED.
From this perspective, the choice of treatments for a given condition depends on some sort of criteria of categorical appropriateness – a determination of what kinds of treatments are appropriate to any given condition, only after which do questions of safety and efficacy come into play. (This becomes more obvious in the letter above when the writer airily dismisses the notorious psychological difficulties of dieting with remarks about “responsibility for one’s actions”.) And this is the question that really got my attention about this issue. The concept of “appropriate” treatment is one that gets to the heart of healthcare as a practice, and of the ethical dimensions of such seemingly scientific concepts as the definition of disease, relative risk, and clinical indications for treatment.
To define clinical indications in some way other than in terms of clinical efficacy establishes medicine as a categorically defined practice: a praxis incorporating certain beliefs or techniques that are “just right”, and eschewing others as “just wrong”. The old ethic of “doctor knows best” exemplifies this idea to some extent (in regard of the roles of patient and physician: the doctor prescribes; the patient complies). More broadly, medical ethics based on a perception of distinctly medical virtues and traditions (Pellegrino’s “internal ethic of medicine”) makes all of medicine categorical; more than that, it moves the locus of medical ethics entirely inside the profession, such that what is right or wrong for a given patient is what is or is not in keeping with the behavioral standards applicable to the doctor. Even more modern theories of medical ethics do the same to the extent that they perceive specific types of treatments as right or wrong in and of themselves.
The movement toward patient autonomy and patient-centered care challenges this ethos at a basic level: the whole idea that patients may determine their own interests for themselves necessarily implies that healthcare is defined as serving those interests (or else we get a macabre dissociation between what patients need and what healthcare is for). The patient-centered ethic has fundamentally reformed healthcare practice in many areas, most notably refusal and termination of unwanted treatments, and more indirectly through the rise of cosmetic, nutritional, sports- or adventure-oriented, assisted reproductive, and other forms of “aspirational” (rather than pathology-driven) healthcare. The idea that what patients need is not determined by the pursuit and maintenance of “normal species functioning” – never exceeding its bounds and normal range, either positively or negatively – throws open a potentially unlimited range of possible treatments for any given condition, and indeed a potentially unlimited range of praxis under any conditions, whether or not defined in terms of disease and treatment. (The body modification movement blows the doors off the disease/treatment model, and increasingly off of any old-fashioned notions of normal species functioning.)
From this perspective, it is impossible even to formulate a declaration of the form: Because the condition is ________, the treatment should be ________. Radically patient-centered care does not require a “condition” to authorize a “treatment”, and takes it as fundamental that some patients may deny that an otherwise-recognized “condition” even exists (as in the case of the “fat acceptance” movement), while others may perceive, personally, a pathology in what would previously have been perceived categorically as normal (as with gender identity disorder). In addition, the particular best treatment for any given patient, whatever their circumstances, will be the one that best meets that patient’s interests as they themselves understand them – which may well be a riskier surgical procedure rather than a more burdensome lifestyle change, or vice versa, as they themselves perceive is best for them.
The significance of this non-categorical, patient-centered, situationally-responsive understanding of healthcare praxis is enormous. Aside from the overt impact on practical healthcare that the patient-autonomy movement continues to have, embracing a truly patient-centered ethic of care guides thinking about how to understand patient needs and how to meet them. In particular, it rules out categorical thinking of the type that prohibits providing certain treatments (with due consideration of cost, risk, and expected benefit) for a given patient or category of patient because they do not conform to some generic standard of appropriateness, and it requires that the patient’s own understanding of their goals, priorities, and risk-tolerance, be the determinative factors. Clearly the message hasn’t reached all corners yet.
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